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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of the current recession on the near-retirement age population. Data
from the Health and Retirement Study suggest that those approaching retirement age (early boomers
ages 53 to 58 in 2006) have only 15.2 percent of their wealth in stocks, held directly or in defined
contribution plans or IRAs. Their vulnerability to a stock market decline is limited by the high value
of their Social Security wealth, which represents over a quarter of the total household wealth of the
early boomers. In addition, their defined contribution plans remain immature, so their defined benefit
plans represent sixty five percent of their pension wealth. Simulations with a structural retirement
model suggest the stock market decline will lead the early boomers to postpone their retirement by
only 1.5 months on average. Health and Retirement Study data also show that those approaching retirement
are not likely to be greatly or immediately affected by the decline in housing prices. We end with a
discussion of important difficulties facing those who would use labor market policies to increase the
employment of older workers.
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The Dow Jones Industrial Average peaked at 14,164 in October 2007. As of tax day,
April 15, 2009, it was just below 8,000, a decline of 43 percent. By September 14, 2009, it had
recovered to above 9,500, a decline of one third. Those unfortunates who have already retired,
can do little about a loss of stock market wealth, or of housing wealth. At the other end of the age
spectrum, younger workers have some decades ahead to adjust their work, savings, and
investment choices before they face retirement. In this paper, we focus on those workers in their
mid 50s, who are on the cusp of retirement.
These workers are of particular interest for several reasons. Since members of this cohort
are approaching retirement age, they do not have much time to adjust their saving behavior to
offset any capital losses. Some hold that this group may also be more vulnerable to drops in the
stock market than earlier generations, because of the shift in recent decades from defined benefit
pension plans (pension plans that provide yearly income for life, funded by the employer, where
a formula determines the benefit based on earnings, age and service) to defined contribution
pension plans (pension accounts such as 401k or 403b plans, established in the name of the
worker, funded by contributions from the worker and/or the firm, and invested in assets
including stocks). These accounts are frequently invested at least partially in the stock market,
and have lost value as a result of the stock market decline. There also has been speculation that
the decline in the stock market will cause many workers who were on the cusp of retirement to
delay any such plans.
We begin by looking at the wealth of those in the near-retirement group; in particular,
from a survey of those in the 53-58 age bracket as of 2006. When we include the wealth from
expected Social Security benefits, along with pensions, housing wealth, and other assets, and
realize that defined benefit plans continue to dominate their pension wealth, just 15.2 percent of
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the total wealth of this group was invested in the stock market, through defined contribution
plans, Individual Retirement Accounts and direct stock holdings. For most of those approaching
retirement age, while losing several percentage points of this total is certainly a significant
average loss—and is of greater significance for those who are more exposed to the stock market
and will experience even larger losses-- these losses will not be life-changing. Many of these
households also have two earners in their household, which provides another cushion against the
blow of stock market losses.
We then examine the likely effects of the stock market plunge on retirement behavior. An
examination of the effect of the dot com bubble on retirement suggests that stock price changes
of this order of magnitude have only a modest effect on the retirement decisions of older persons,
changing retirement age by only a few months on average. Even if the stock market decline,
taken alone, modestly decreases the number of retirements, the recession that started in 2007
may substantially increases retirement due to poor job prospects. Thus, the net effect of a deep
recession and a falling stock market may be an overall increase in retirements.
The decline in housing prices and changes in mortgage debt then enter the picture.
Although the decline in housing prices is substantial, not many in the “early boomer” population
of those in their mid 50s will find their housing wealth under water, with negative equity as their
loans exceed the gross value of their house, and many in this population will have already paid
off most or all of their mortgages. Moreover, most will not wish to cash out their home equity for
many years to come, affording time for the housing market to recover.
The combination of these various effects of the stock market decline, recessionary
pressures in the labor market, and decline in housing wealth may well hit a segment of the nearretirement population hard. An older person who has experienced a layoff has a good chance of
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being forced into retirement, meaning that fewer resources will have to be spread over a longer
retirement period, and even if the older individual finds another job, it will most likely be at a
much lower wage than was earned on a long term job (Chan and Huff Stevens, 2004). New
survey data collected by Rohwedder (2009) for Rand suggests that some will be subject to the
combined effects of layoffs and wealth losses. As a result they may be unable to meet mortgage
obligations, and at the same time face the prospect of selling their homes near the bottom of a
down market.
We conclude with some policy implications and conclusions. A major challenge will be
that the pattern of financial losses, job losses, and real estate stress will differ greatly among
members of the near-retirement age population. Targeting policy just at those most affected will
be difficult, Moreover, most of those who suffer large financial losses will come from the upper
part of the wealth distribution, which undermines the rationale for policy initiatives that would
support all or most of those who have suffered in the downturn.

Potential Losses from the Decline in the Stock Market
For evidence on those near retirement, we turn to the “Early Boomer” cohort of the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). This cohort includes 2,492 households with at least one
member age 51 to 56 in 2004.1 Observations are from 2006, two years after most of those in the
early boomer cohort entered the Health and Retirement Study. Data from the 2008 wave of the
Health and Retirement Study were not available at the time this article was written, but most of
the data collected in that wave were collected before the stock market began its sharp decline.
1

Some members of the early boomer cohort were first interviewed before their cohort entered
the Health and Retirement Study in 2004. They are younger spouses from households where the
older spouse qualified the household for inclusion in the Health and Retirement Study in either
1992 or 1998.
3

The Components of Total Wealth
To set the stage for the analysis of the vulnerability of the retirement age population to
the decline in the stock market, household wealth for this cohort is disaggregated into its basic
components. In the initial description of the importance of different retirement assets, particular
attention is paid to the roles of Social Security and pensions in retirement wealth.
By 2006, as seen in row 1 of Table 1, early boomer households had accumulated an
average of $766,945 in total wealth, with the median 10 percent of wealth-holding households
owning $536,997 in total assets. Social Security and pensions combined to account, on average,
for 49.1 percent of total wealth. For the median ten percent of wealth holding households, Social
Security and pensions together account for sixty percent of total wealth.
As seen by comparing the value reported in row 3, column 1 of Table 1 to the other
values in column 1, the present value of Social Security is the single biggest asset. Earnings
histories are obtained from the Social Security Administration with the permission of the
respondent. Monthly benefits are then calculated from those histories assuming the respondent
retires immediately so that Social Security wealth is prorated based on work to date. Calculating
Social Security wealth requires placing a present value on the expected stream of future
payments. Social Security wealth includes benefits based on own earnings, and if married based
on spouse’s own earnings, as well as spouse and survivor benefits if relevant. Social Security
wealth then is calculated using the intermediate assumptions from the Social Security
Administration, including a 5.8 percent nominal discount rate, 2.8 percent inflation and 1.1
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percent real wage growth.2 Based on this calculation, Social Security wealth represents over a
quarter of total wealth (26.1 percent), and 40 percent of the total wealth of the median ten
percent of wealth- holding households.
Pensions are the second largest asset, accounting for 23.0 percent of average wealth.
Respondents holding defined benefit plans report the annual benefits they would receive if they
retired at their expected retirement age. Again, the present discounted value of wealth from the
future payments of defined benefit plans expected by respondents is calculated using the
intermediate assumptions from the Social Security Administration, including a 5.8 percent
nominal discount rate, 2.8 percent inflation and 1.1 percent real wage growth.3 In addition, the
benefits of defined benefit plans are prorated on the basis of work to date. (For those expecting
benefits from previous jobs, it is calculated as the present value of those benefits as of 2006. For
those already collecting from a defined benefit plan, it is the present value of remaining benefits
as of 2006.) Wealth in defined contribution plans is measured by respondent reports of account
balances. Table 1, line 5, shows that 15 percent of total wealth is held in defined benefit plans.
From line 6, only 8 percent of total wealth is held in defined contribution accounts. Thus, despite
the rapid growth in coverage by defined contribution plans in recent decades, such plans held by
2

The 5.8 percent discount rate is the steady state rate for the period preceding the financial
decline (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2004). Note that given the risks to full payment of
both Social Security and defined benefit plans, one could argue for using a higher discount rate.
On the other hand, the real interest rate will also change, declining in the period immediately
following the downturn, and increasing after that. The present value calculations were provided
by Kapinos et al. (2008).
3

According to the latest report of the Board of Trustees (U.S. Social Security Administration,
2009), as a result of the financial decline, interest rates are expected to stay below 5 percent
through 2011, then fluctuate between 5.6 and 6 percent until 2017, when they return to a steady
state rate of 5.7 percent. The relatively modest decline in interest rates in the short run from the
5.8 percent rate assumed in our calculations would increase the value of defined benefit plans
and would have only a small effect on the present value of Social Security benefits to be received
by this cohort.
5

the early boomer population account for only a little over a third (35 percent) of their total
pension wealth. (Wealth in Individual Retirement Accounts often originates in defined
contribution pensions, so that some older defined contribution plans appear as part of IRA
balances reported below.)4
The value of the home, defined as the value of the house net of any mortgage or other
home loan, represents 22 percent of total wealth. With little direct need to be aware of housing
prices, one might doubt whether prices reported by the near-retirement age population fully
reflect current market prices, but Bucks and Pence (2006) report that most people are well
informed about their housing values. (We will have a more to say about the relation of home
values to mortgage values below.) Real estate, business assets and vehicles account for another
12.2 percent of assets. Financial assets account for 9.8 percent of total wealth, with IRA assets
accounting for the remaining 6.8 percent.
Table 2 presents the breakdown of wealth for couple households and households
consisting of single males and single females. One way to gain perspective on these figures is to
compare the figures for couples with the sum of a single male and single female. For example,
total wealth is $131,386 higher on average in couple households than in the sum of single male
and single female households. Social Security wealth held by couple households is more than 12
percent greater than the sum of Social Security wealth in single male and single female
households. Couple households also have much higher pension wealth ($216,220 vs. $158,932).
The differences in benefits in favor of couple households are the result of higher earnings for
4

Upon entering the Health and Retirement Study, 6.6 percent of those in the “early boomer”
cohort reported they had rolled over a defined contribution pension from a job held previously
into an IRA, with the average value of the roll over equal to $83,698. Similarly, 2.4 percent of
those in the early boomer cohort reported having rolled over a defined benefit plan from a
previous job into an IRA with an average value of $44,345. For further details, see Gustman,
Steinmeier and Tabatabai (forthcoming, chapter 11).
6

men in couple versus single households. In 2004 earnings in all households of single men
averaged $27,560, while earnings by men in couple households averaged $48,798. For women
from single households, earnings averaged $25,157, while women from couple households had
average earnings of $25,995.
Table 3 indicates how assets are distributed for households falling within different wealth
deciles. As seen in row 3, as total wealth increases, Social Security wealth declines as a share of
total wealth; conversely, row 4 indicates that pensions increase in importance as total wealth
rises. Together, the share of total wealth due to the sum of Social Security and pensions declines,
but the decline is steady and modest through the ninetieth percentile. Comparing rows 5 and 6,
the share of total wealth due to both defined benefit and defined contribution pensions increases
by wealth decile. At the ninth decile, defined benefit pensions are more than twice as important
as defined contribution pensions. The share of wealth held in IRAs increases with wealth decile.
In contrast, although the share of total wealth in housing increases through the bottom half of the
wealth distribution, it remains between 22 and 23 percent for those in the top part of the
distribution. The share of total wealth held in stocks rises from 1.5 percent in the lowest decile,
to 22.6 percent in the highest. (As noted under Tables 1-3, these totals exclude both the top and
bottom 1 percent of households as a way of addressing measurement error problems.)
Exposure to the Stock Market Decline
We use the share of wealth in stocks as an indicator of a household’s vulnerability to a
stock market decline. Consider first the total share of the wealth in defined contribution plans
held in stocks. Of the $61,621 average balance in defined contribution plans indicated in line 6 of
Table 1, $44,506 comes from plans held on the current job. In 2006, on average, almost 62
percent ($27,470/$44,506) of total assets held in pensions on current jobs was held in stocks. We
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use the share of assets from defined contribution plans on current jobs held in stocks by each
individual to approximate the share of total pension wealth from current and past jobs held in the
form of stocks.5 This yields a value of $38,801 for our estimate of the total value of defined
contribution balances held in stocks.
Individual Retirement Accounts are a second asset with direct holdings in stocks. On
average, 6.8 percent of total wealth is in the form of IRA assets, with 74 percent (38,452/52,270)
of IRA balances held in stocks. In addition, direct stock holdings represent 5.1 percent of total
wealth.
Taking the sum of defined contribution pension accounts held in stocks, IRA holdings in
stocks, and direct stock holdings, that yields 15.2 percent of total wealth ($116,535/$766,945)
held in the form of stocks. Thus, a substantial and permanent decline in the stock market from its
2006 level means an average fall of several percentage points in average wealth. This loss is a
significant one: percentage points of personal wealth should never be taken lightly. But it is not a
life-changing loss for the average household. We will return to the question of the distribution of
losses below, but before turning to that issue, consider the reasons for the relatively small
exposure to the stock market decline on average.

5

Note that the share of defined contribution plans held in stocks is reported only for those who
report their defined contribution plan separately from any defined benefit plan they might hold.
When a respondent is asked plan type and reports holding “Both” a defined benefit and a defined
contribution plan as the initial response, the Health and Retirement Study does not ask about the
share of pensions in the stock market in the defined contribution plan. For these individuals, the
share of the defined contribution part of the account held in stocks is imputed based on the share
of defined contribution plans held as stocks by individuals who have reported having two plans
from their employer, one a defined benefit and the other a defined contribution plan, reporting
those plans separately rather than as having “both” plan types. Similarly, the Health and
Retirement Study does not ask about the share of pensions from previous jobs that are held in
stocks. The share of assets in last or previous plans held in stocks is imputed from stock holdings
in pensions on current jobs.
8

One answer is that 34.6 percent of households report they have no assets in stocks. When
we average the ratios of stock value to total wealth, the mean is 9.43 percent, which is
significantly below the ratio of total stock value to total wealth of 15.2 found in Table 1. About
67 percent of the households have a ratio of stock value to total wealth that falls below the mean
of the ratios. The share of those who own no stocks declines as we move up the wealth
distribution, but there are some stock holders in each wealth decile. Thus on the one hand, 8.9
percent of the population falls both in the lowest wealth decile and has nothing invested in
stocks. On the other hand, 5.0 percent of the population falls in the upper wealth decile and has a
ratio of total wealth in stocks to total wealth that falls in the top two deciles of that distribution.
Why do so few households choose to own stocks, and why is the share of total wealth in
stocks so low? One reason is the high value of Social Security. The magnitude of Social Security
wealth tends to make the share of assets in stocks smaller than might be expected for most of the
population.6
Another reason for the limited direct exposure of the retirement age population to the
stock market decline is the incomplete status of the transition from defined benefit to defined
contribution plans for the population now approaching retirement. Remember, despite the strong
trend to defined contribution pension plans over time, just over one-third of the pension wealth
of this near-retirement population is held in a defined contribution plan. Much of this difference
seems to stem from the fact that for the “Early Boomer” cohort, pension tenure averages 16.8
6

Social Security also provides good news from an insurance perspective. Because Social
Security benefits are based on the highest 35 years of earnings, and benefits are determined by a
progressive formula, for most households Social Security benefits are relatively insensitive to
any earnings lost due to layoffs late in the career. Of course, layoffs may induce claiming of
Social Security benefits earlier in life. But while this reduces annual benefits, the total actuarial
value of Social Security wealth over the lifetime is not greatly affected by the choice of when to
start claiming benefits.
9

years for those with a defined benefit plan, while averaging 9.7 years for those with a defined
contribution plan—a ratio of 1.73 (Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai, forthcoming). Similarly,
the ratio of pension values between defined benefit and defined contribution plans held by this
cohort of households in 2004 is 1.86 to one. This pattern suggests that almost the entire
difference in plan values between defined benefit and defined contribution plans may be due to
the current immaturity of defined contribution plans. Indeed, Samwick and Skinner (2004)
predict that defined benefit and defined contribution plans will have similar values in the long
run.
To be sure, defined benefit plans are vulnerable to stock price declines, as firms and local
governments may find that they have not put aside enough money to finance promised benefits.
But in many circumstances, wealth in the form of a defined benefit plan held by those
approaching retirement age is less subject to change than are the promised payments of defined
benefit plans for younger workers. Older workers have often been grandfathered and exempted
from major plan changes, or changes have built-in lags, further postponing any action that might
otherwise affect older workers. Many of those who are forced to retire early receive additional
service and wage credits, mitigating any penalty for failing to stay until they qualify for early
retirement benefits. Unless the firm is bankrupt, benefits cannot be reduced below the levels
promised on the basis of work to date. In addition, benefits from private sector defined benefit
plans are insured by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, although there is a cap on the
insured benefit of $54,000 for a 65 year old in 2009.
Thus the combination of high Social Security benefits, continued importance of defined
benefit plans, the immaturity of defined contribution plans, and the failure of almost 35 percent
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of all households to participate in the stock market, all account for the low exposure of the
retirement age population to the decline in the stock market.
Now let us consider the distribution of wealth losses from the stock market decline in
somewhat more detail. From the baseline data on the distribution of wealth held in stocks in the
bottom row of Table 3, we have seen how the potential vulnerability to the stock market decline
varies according to wealth decile. Exposure to stocks ranges from 1.5 percent to 7.4 percent for
those in the bottom five deciles of the wealth distribution.7
Again, Social Security plays a central role in the story. Those in the lower wealth deciles
are heavily dependent on Social Security. Looking across row 3 of Table 3, Social Security
wealth accounts for 65 percent or more of the total wealth of those in the bottom three deciles of
the wealth distribution. In contrast, those in the top wealth decile have only 11.1 percent of their
total wealth from Social Security.
The extent of exposure to stocks seems relatively modest even for those in the highest
wealth decile. As seen in the bottom row, last column of Table 3, those in the top 10 percent of
the wealth distribution (with the top 1 percent having been removed) hold less than a quarter
(22.6 percent) of their total wealth in stocks. The good news here is that those who have been
hurt the most by the stock market decline are among the wealthiest in the country and are able to
absorb the losses without entering the ranks of the poor. However, any public policy plans that
were predicated on higher taxes for the wealthy look less attractive and politically viable when
the amount of wealth has just declined substantially.

7

Overall, 34.6 percent of the population does not own stocks, but the share of total wealth in
stocks is positive, even for those in the lowest wealth decile (as shown in Table 3). The reason
behind what may seem like an inconsistency in the data is that the share of those who own no
stocks declines as we move up the wealth distribution, but there are some stockholders and nonstockholders in each wealth decile.
11

Retirement and a Stock Market Bubble
It will take some years before it is possible to measure the effects on retirement of the
stock market decline of 2008-2009, and to separate the effects of the stock market decline on
retirements from the effects of layoffs and high unemployment on retirement. However, the U.S.
economy recently experienced another episode of a rapid increase in stock prices, followed by a
sharp decline—the episode often known as the dot-com bubble. Using a structural model of
retirement and saving estimated with panel data from the original sample in the Health and
Retirement Study, and using parameters fit from analysis of the 1996-1999 boom in stock prices,
it is possible to use simulations of the model to obtain an idea of the effects of changes in stock
market prices alone on retirement behavior.
The model we use is a life cycle model with stochastic returns to wealth. Utility in each
year is a function of leisure and consumption:

U =

N

∑

t =0

e - ρt s t [

1
α

C αt + e βX t + ε L t ]

subject to the usual intertemporal budget constraint, where s is the survival rate, X is a vector
including age and health, and L takes on a value of 1 if the individual is retired and 0
otherwise. In such a model, an above-average increase in stock market wealth produces a
positive income effect which should increase the consumption of all normal goods, including
leisure. Since the work-leisure choice in this model is binary, the increased lifetime leisure takes
the form of earlier retirement.
The model allows individual heterogeneity in both time preference (ρ) and the preference
for leisure vs. work (ε). The heterogeneity in time preference allows the model to capture the
wide variation in wealth even for individuals with similar lifetime earnings opportunities. The
12

heterogeneity in leisure preferences is equivalent to a variation in retirement preferences, given
the binary work-retirement decision, and allows the model to capture the variation in retirement
outcomes of similarly situated individuals. After the individual retires, the model also allows for
unexpected changes in retirement preferences to reflect that some individuals find retirement
more enjoyable than expected, and some find it less enjoyable.
The lifetime resources include earnings, Social Security, and pensions. The model is
estimated from data in the Health and Retirement Study through 2000, which includes the stock
market boom of the late 1990s. The sample for both the estimation and simulations is the original
Health and Retirement Study participants, which included families with at least one spouse born
between 1931 and 1941. This data set is unique in that it contains (for most respondents) Social
Security earnings records and pension descriptions from employers, both of which are used in
the estimation. Financial wealth, including assets in defined contribution accounts, is presumed
to be half in stocks and stock funds, roughly consistent with estimates from the Health and
Retirement Study for the middle part of the wealth distribution. The distribution of returns is
presumed to be known and is taken from Ibbotson (2002) data, but of course individuals do not
know future returns when they are making their retirement and savings decisions in a given year.
For both estimation and simulation, the model is solved using a stochastic dynamic
approach which solves for labor supply and consumption over the entire life cycle. The estimated
model parameters allow the model to reproduce the actual patterns of retirement fairly well,
including the pronounced spike of retirement at age 62 and the percentage of individuals who
return to full-time work after a period of retirement. Further details of the model and its
estimation are found in Gustman and Steinmeier (2002).
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In the five-year period starting in 1995, the stock market rose by almost 21 percent per
year compounded. Since inflation was relatively low at the time, almost all of this increase
represents an increase in real value. A typical stock portfolio would have been worth about twoand-a-half times as much at the end of the five years as at the beginning. Since annual stock
returns exhibit little serial correlation, it seems safe to assume that these returns were largely
unanticipated. And then the bubble burst. During the period from the beginning of 2000 to the
end of September 2002, the market fell by 13 percent per year. From the market peak until
August 2002, the cumulative decline was 34 percent, so that a little more than a third of stock
market wealth evaporated in two years. This is similar in magnitude to the decline in the stock
market in the recession of 2008-2009.
We first consider the effects of the stock market boom on retirement. For this analysis,
we will consider the boom to be the years 1995 through 1999. To simulate the effects of the
stock market boom on retirement, we do two simulations. In one simulation, normal returns are
assumed for the years 2000 and beyond. In the other simulation, normal returns are assumed for
the years 1995 and beyond. In other words, the difference between these two simulations will
represent the effects on retirement of five years of high returns.
Figure 1 reports on the differences between these two simulations. In this figure, the
height of the bars represents the difference in the percentage of individuals retired in the
specified year (and thus not the number of individuals newly retiring in that year). For instance,
the bar in 1999 reflects that in the base simulation 63.2 percent of the sample was retired, while
in the simulation with higher stock market returns 66.5 percent was retired. The shaded parts of
the bars indicate the difference in retirement by individuals who have not been previously
retired, and the white parts of the bars indicate the difference in retirement caused by individuals
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staying retired rather than returning to work. The total heights of the bars thus indicate the total
difference in retirement. The difference in new retirements is somewhat but not overwhelmingly
more than the difference in retirement caused by individuals not returning to work.
The volume of retirements in Figure 1 is higher in each year during the period of the high
stock market returns. At its peak in 1999, the percent retired in the sample is about 3.3
percentage points higher than it would be without the extra stock returns. The effect continues
long after 1999, since the extra returns apply not just to those who retire during this period, but to
individuals who would be retiring in the succeeding years. As time goes by, however, the effect
of those returns gradually diminishes, both because individuals will have longer to adjust
consumption to the higher levels of assets and because more and more of the sample would have
retired anyway.
To find the effect on the average retirement age, we note that the bar for 1996 means that
with the stock market boom, 1.2 percent of the sample would have been retired for one additional
year. For 1997, 1.7 percent would have been retired one additional year, 2.9 percent for 1998,
and so on. Adding the effects for the various years, including years beyond 2003 not shown in
the graph, we find that a total of 25% of the sample would have been retired for one additional
year. This yields the conclusion is that the average length of retirement would be increased by
0.25 years, or about three months, and the average age of retirement would be reduced by a
corresponding amount. This figure implies that at least three-quarters of the sample would not
have changed their retirement date as a result of the stock market boom, which is consistent with
the previously documented fact that a large minority of the sample had no or only limited
financial assets. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect appears reasonable. According to Venti
and Wise (1999, Table 4), the average respondent had about $79,000 in financial and retirement
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assets in the first wave of the survey. The 1995-1999 surge in the stock market would cause a
portfolio of 50 percent stocks to have risen by about 60 percent more than the usual increase, so
the unexpected gain would have been around $47,000, or somewhat more than a year’s worth of
average earnings. The simulated decrease of 0.25 years in the average retirement age indicates
that respondents do take part of this unexpected gain in the form of increased retirement, but that
the major part of it goes toward increased consumption. Others who investigated the effects of
the dot com bubble on retirement reached similar conclusions, like Coronado and Perozek (2003)
and Hurd, Reti and Rohwedder (2009).
Figure 2 considers an analogous exercise to analyze the effects of the sharply lower stock
prices in the early years of the new century. The figure again compares two simulations, one
using actual returns until 2002 and normal returns thereafter and the other using actual returns
until 1999 and normal returns thereafter. The difference between these two scenarios reveals that
between 2000 and 2002, the negative effects on retirement of the stock market declines develop
rapidly, reaching a 3.2 percentage point decrease in 2003. The average delay, according to these
figures, is 0.125 years, which translates into 1.5 months. The peak effect is approximately the
same size and in the opposite direction from the effect of the previous stock market increase.
The effect decreases more rapidly from this peak, however, undoubtedly because retirement in
this sample is much further along in 2003 than in 1999. As a result, the total effect is only about
half as much as for the previous stock market increase.
Taking these scenarios together, our story is that the extraordinary returns in the stock
market in the late 1990s, which more than doubled stock prices and unexpectedly increased the
value of a mixed portfolio by nearly 60 percent, increased retirement for those near-retirement by
over 3 percentage points by the turn of the century and would have decreased the average
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retirement age by about a quarter of a year—if it had not been interrupted. The subsequent
decline in the market, which very nearly wiped out the gains that had been made during the
preceding surge, effectively neutralized the effect of the preceding stock market gains on
retirement, and would have delayed retirements by .125 years, or 1.5 months. The effects of the
stock bubble were to increase retirement as long as the bubble continued, but the continuing
effects of the bubble after its end are probably minimal.
Based on these findings, we expect the changes in stock market prices from the bear
stock market of 2008-2009 to have a slightly greater effect on retirement than the dot com
bubble, given the similar change in stock market prices and greater accumulation of assets held
in stocks in defined contribution pension plans and Individual Retirement Accounts.
Nevertheless, our findings also suggest that if one combined both the run-up of the stock market
in the years before 2007 and the decline of 2008-2009, the net effects of the stock market bust on
retirement will be relatively limited.
The distribution of these effects is seen in Table 4. The distribution of the delay in
retirement responses reported in Table 4 breaks down the results of Table 3 according to the
percentage of simulations where individuals delay retirement. Only 9.6 percent of the sample
will delay their retirement by a year or more as a result of the stock market decline, with 7.3
percent of the retirement age population delaying their retirement by one year, and 1.8 percent of
the population delaying retirement by two years. From the lofty standpoint of aggregate labor
market statistics, these effects do not appear large. But retirement is a major lifetime decision,
one that workers often consider and lead up to for some years. Suddenly feeling a need to
reconsider a retirement decision and then postponing retirement for a year or more would
certainly feel like a substantial misfortune to many retirees.
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Once again, the above figures relate to the effects of wealth changes and do not consider
the layoffs that are created by the recession accompanying the decline in stock market prices.
The retirements resulting from layoffs are in the opposite direction from the tendency of reduced
wealth to reduce retirement.8 It is not just that higher unemployment rates depress the probability
of finding a job. Even in a nonrecessionary period, most older workers who lose a job are unable
to find employment paying anything near the wage they received from a long term employer.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Survey, Huff-Stevens and Chan (2001) find, for
example, “Four years after job losses at age 55, the employment rate of displaced workers
remains 20 percentage points below the employment rate of similar nondisplaced workers.”
One other word of caution is in order. The preceding retirement analysis pertains to the
effect of the stock market decline on retirements, holding other changes constant. However,
overall changes in labor force participation and retirements of those nearing retirement age also
reflect the influence of a host of other factors. There has been a clear increasing trend in the labor
force participation of older women. In addition, Social Security rules have been changed to
increase the reward to work after normal retirement age. There have been changes in provisions
of defined benefit pensions that reduce the penalty to delayed retirement. There is the trend to
defined contribution plans, and laws and court rulings against age discrimination. These and
other factors have worked toward increasing the labor force participation of men over 65
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 2009). The trend in labor force participation of men in their fifties and
early sixties is less clear, clouded by increasing participation in disability programs. In light of
the influence of all of these factors, one should be very careful in drawing conclusions about the
8

Coile and Levine (2009), using a reduced form relation between retirements and unemployment
in CPS data over time, suggest that the increase in unemployment will raise retirements by about
twelve percent, but that the entire effect will fall on those 62 to 69 years of age, with no effect on
those in their fifties or early sixties.
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likely effects of the recession on labor force participation and retirement without separating out
trend from cycle.

Potential Vulnerability to House Price Declines
In the last few years, those at the cusp of retirement have not only seen their assets
decline because of the fall in the stock market, but also because of the decline in housing prices.
To provide an indication of the vulnerability of the “Early Boomer” population to the housing
price decline, Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution of the ratio of mortgage value to house
price for this group as of 2006.9 As seen on the y-axis, 46.4 percent of Early Boomer households
had no mortgage.10 One-fifth of early boomer households (22.8 percent) had zero house value
and were presumably renters. For members of the “Early Boomer” cohort with a positive home
value, the mortgage amounts to 38.9 percent of the home value. (The average of the ratios of
mortgage to home value is 24.9 percent.) The dotted vertical line in Figure 3 at 100 represents a
ratio of mortgage to house value of one to one. Only 1.7 percent of the early boomer households
lie to the right of 100, and thus had a house value lower than their mortgage obligation in 2006.
If housing prices declined by 20 percent to the vertical line at 80, 6.4 percent of the early boomer
population would be in a position where their housing value on current markets would fall below
9

Twenty households with a mortgage greater than 200 percent of the reported house value have
been excluded from the figure.
10

The Health and Retirement Study has oversampled minority populations. In addition, some
members of the early boomer cohort may have initially been sampled before 2004 as younger
members of households with a spouse in an age range that qualified the household for inclusion
in an older cohort. Both factors affect an observation’s sample weight. Figure 3 and related
percentages and means describing home ownership and mortgage holding are not weighted, but
using weights does not make a substantial difference here. With weights, the percent of
households without any mortgage mentioned in this paragraph is 43.2 percent. With weights, the
percent of renters is 19.0 percent.
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what they owed on their mortgage. But for most of those who would be under water, the gap
between their house value and mortgage would be relatively small.11
There is a more fundamental question that should be addressed -- should housing wealth
be included among the sources of wealth that will support consumption in retirement? Venti and
Wise (2004) conclude that for the most part, older persons hold their housing to provide an
environment in which to live, not to finance general retirement consumption. They find that most
households do not draw down their housing wealth, even when they move. Households that do
draw down their housing wealth are those that experience a precipitating shock in terms of health
or death of a spouse. Thus while households may consider housing as a buffer insuring against
catastrophic circumstances, they do not consider the house as a source of support for
consumption. This might argue in favor of excluding housing wealth from the list of assets
owned by the household. However, home ownership does support housing consumption.
Moreover, there are financial implications of the decline in housing prices not only for those who
are under water, but also for those who upgraded their homes in expectation of continuing capital
gains. Thus we include housing wealth along with other assets to distinguish between those
households who must pay rent and those who will not have to devote assets toward rent, in view
of the role of housing as a buffer against catastrophic events, freeing other assets to support
consumption, and in view of the financial implications for those who considered their homes to
be an investment. All of that said, in most cases the retirement consumption of those nearing
retirement will be little affected by the fall in housing prices. Nor do we expect the fall in
housing prices to have a major effect on retirements.
11

Of course, a more precise analysis would allow for geographic variation in the decline in
housing prices, but one cannot use the restricted pension and Social Security data from the
Health and Retirement Study and at the same time have access to geographic detail. For further
discussion and findings, see Rohwedder (2009).
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To be sure, those within the Early Boomer population in deepest trouble will be those
suffering multiple adverse events. From Table 3, row 8, moving up the wealth distribution, both
the share of total wealth in housing (net of mortgages) and the share of total wealth in stocks
increase. Those in the top wealth decile have 22 percent of their wealth in housing and an
additional 23 percent of their wealth in stocks. A twenty percent decline in housing prices would
reduce the total wealth of those in the top decile by about 4.5 percent, to be compounded with a
7.5 percent decline in wealth due to a stock market decline of one third. We also examine the
correlation between share of wealth in stocks and immediate vulnerability to a stock market
decline by correlating the share of total wealth in stocks with the ratio of housing equity to total
value of the house. The correlation is zero.
Perhaps even more troubling than the separate effects of the declines in the stock market
and housing market, job loss itself may trigger multiple adverse events. For example, those
without jobs will be less likely to meet their mortgage payments and will be in the greatest
danger of losing their homes. Job losers who wish to move to a new location to take a new job
may not be able to sell their homes in a short time without heavily discounting the price.
Those experiencing layoffs aside, as our discussion above indicates, the decline in
housing prices is likely to have a less immediate impact on consumption in retirement than will
the fall in stock prices. Most people in their 50s are unlikely to sell their homes for many years -until one spouse becomes ill or dies. Thus, again with the notable and important exception of
those who experience a job layoff, a decline in housing prices may have a less immediate effect
on the population approaching retirement age than the decline in other asset prices.
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Policy Implications and Conclusions
The average person approaching retirement age is not likely to suffer a life changing
financial loss from the stock market downturn of 2008-2009. To some extent, average
households on the cusp of retirement are shielded by the fact that stock market holdings do not
loom especially large in their overall wealth. In addition, the near-retirement generation is more
likely than younger generations to have a defined benefit plan as a primary pension, rather than a
defined contribution plan, which also cushions the decline in wealth due to a stock market
decline. In part because of the limited effect of the stock market decline on the near-retirement
age population, the effect of the decline on retirements is likely to be very limited. Indeed, when
account is taken of involuntary job loss and limited opportunities for employment at pay
comparable to that received on a long term job, retirements may be accelerated as a result of the
stock market decline and recession rather than deferred.
This is not to argue that the effects of the downturn are small. Stock market losses aside,
many will have lost jobs and homes. In this circumstance, our instinct is often to redesign or
adopt new policies. However, in dealing with the older population, it is no easy task to think of
policy changes that will be cost effective in remedying obvious market and policy failures.
Indeed, there are many reasons not to leap to policy reform on the basis of our recent experience.
Efforts to bail out the big losers, who are those with high levels of wealth, are a
nonstarter. One might also advocate additional policies to encourage adoption of a more prudent
asset mix by those approaching retirement age. Pension providers should certainly continue to
remind those approaching retirement age about the risks from defined contribution plans with
portfolios that are overwhelmingly invested in stocks. But those approaching retirement are now
better aware of those risks. Moreover, absent investments in inflation indexed securities, they
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face the danger from overreliance on fixed income securities that will generate declining real
incomes over time. One might also advocate increased support for defined benefit plans.
Although defined benefit pensions played a useful role in cushioning against the market decline,
today we are far from having the kind of industry and union structure that made these plans a
stable and reliable source of retirement incomes. It is unlikely that any policy initiative will be
able to reverse the tide away from defined benefit plans. Social Security provided an important
cushion against the market decline, but that would be an inadequate reason for resolving the
debate on how best to deal with Social Security deficits by opting for a financially buttressed
version of the current system. Our recent experience should not end the debate about whether to
adopt incremental reforms to Social Security or to move some of the system toward personal
accounts. Although redesign of Social Security should certainly take account of the risks inherent
in personal accounts, the higher returns to stocks, and approaches for cushioning Social Security
beneficiaries against market declines even when Social Security is supplemented by personal
accounts (Feldstein and Rangolova, 2001) should also be taken into account.
Although we could wish for public policies to help those older persons who have been
forced into premature retirement or prolonged work at a relatively low wage, labor market
policies are especially difficult to target effectively on an older population. For example,
encouraging part-time work by the elderly will encourage continued work by some who would
otherwise retire from the labor force, but may also result in an equal and offsetting decline in
hours of work by those who, in the absence of a policy change, would have continued to work
full time instead of choosing to partially retire (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2008). It is also
difficult to efficiently target job training and jobs programs on the retirement age population,
distinguishing troubled workers from those who are simply in the process of retiring. In the
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absence of a recession, wages would be falling, many would be leaving long term jobs and the
labor market, and many would be working part-time at lower wages. Moreover, job training
programs for older workers face short payback periods that limit their returns (Hutchens, 1986,
1987). In the absence of any obvious remedies particularly suitable for those approaching
retirement age, we may simply be limited to applying the current menu of labor market programs
to older as well as prime age workers.
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Table 1: Components of Wealth in 2006 For Households with at Least One Member Born from
1948 to 1953: Current Dollars*
Mean
Median 10 Percent Of
Source of Wealth
Households
Value
($)

Percent of
Total
(%)

Value
($)

Percent of
Total
(%)

Total

766,945

100

536,997

100

Social Security Plus Pensions

376,618

49.1

321,429

59.9

Social Security

200,158

26.1

215,569

40.1

Pension Value

176,460

23.0

105,860

19.7

DB Value

114,838

15.0

74,071

13.8

DC Value

61,621

8.0

31,789

5.9

Current DC Balances

44,506

5.8

24,016

4.5

Current DC in Stocks

27,470

3.6

16,080

3.0

Net House Value

169,090

22.0

119,899

22.3

Real Estate

36,201

4.7

17,508

3.3

Business Assets

39,803

5.2

8,423

1.6

Net Value of Vehicles

17,810

2.3

17,478

3.3

Financial Assets

75,153

9.8

27,083

5.0

39,282

5.1

9,616

1.8

52,270

6.8

25,177

4.7

IRA in Stocks Value

38,452

5.0

18,213

3.4

IRA Plus Stocks Holdings
Plus DC in Stocks

116,535

15.2

49,363

9.2

Direct Stocks Holdings
IRA Assets

Observations
2,493
Note: The values under “Median 10 Percent of Households” are the means of the indicated assets
when averaged over the median 10 percent of wealth-holding households. To reduce
measurement error, households with the top and bottom 1% of total wealth are excluded from the
table. Observations are weighted. Data on Social Security wealth is from an updated version of
Kapinos et al. (2008). Pension wealth is calculated by the authors from respondent reports of
expected benefits, actual benefits and account balances. Defined benefit plan values on current
jobs are computed on the basis of work to date to make them comparable to values of defined
contribution plans. Share of defined contribution pension wealth in stocks is imputed for each
observation, including imputations for all defined contribution plans from last or previous jobs.
This creates a slight discrepancy between the total of holdings in stocks reported in the table and
the share of holdings in stocks that would be computed by multiplying the total defined
contribution value by the ratio of current defined contribution holdings in stocks to current
defined contribution balances. Other components of wealth are from the Rand HRS data file,
including imputations of missing values.
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Table 2: Components of Wealth in 2006 For Couples And Single Males and Females with at
Least One Household Member Born from 1948 to 1953: Current Dollars*
Couples
Source of Wealth

Single Males

Single Females

Mean
Value
($)

Percent
of Total
(%)

Mean
Value
($)

Percent
of Total
(%)

Mean
Value
($)

Percent
of Total
(%)

Total

920,517

100.0

430,046

100.0

359,085

100.0

Social Security Plus
Pensions

455,094

49.4

199,505

46.4

171,856

47.9

Social Security

238,874

25.9

114,753

26.7

97,676

27.2

Pension Value

216,220

23.5

84,752

19.7

74,180

20.7

Males

159,793

17.4

-

-

-

-

Females

75,852

8.2

-

-

-

-

DB Value

138,218

15.0

65,922

15.3

51,070

14.2

DC Value

78,001

8.5

18,830

4.4

23,111

6.4

Current DC
Balances

57,002

6.2

10,003

2.3

16,470

4.6

Current DC in
Stocks

35,466

3.9

6,576

1.5

8,668

2.4

Net House Value

195,897

21.3

100,942

23.5

104,571

29.1

Real Estate

45,307

4.9

22,499

5.2

7,456

2.1

Business Assets

49,577

5.4

18,474

4.3

13,770

3.8

Net Value of Vehicles

21,421

2.3

11,265

2.6

7,219

2.0

Financial Assets

90,926

9.9

43,811

10.2

30,922

8.6

Direct Stocks
Holdings

48,983

5.3

13,720

3.2

16,640

4.6

IRA Assets

62,296

6.8

33,551

7.8

23,291

6.5

Value

45,944

5.0

22,825

5.3

17,984

5.0

IRA Plus Stock
Holdings Plus DC in
Stocks

144,401

15.7

49,388

11.5

46,927

13.1

IRA in Stocks

Observations
1,657
325
509
Note: To reduce problems of measurement error, households with top and bottom 1 percent of
total wealth are excluded.
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Table 3: Distribution of Assets by Wealth Decile in 2006 For Households with at Least One
Member Born from 1948 to 1953
Sources of
Wealth
Total Wealth
($000)
(Social
Security
Wealth
+Pension
Wealth)/Total
Wealth (%)
Social
Security
Wealth/Total
Wealth (%)
Total Pension
Wealth/Total
Wealth (%)
DC Pension
Wealth/Total
Wealth (%)
DB Pension
Wealth/Total
Wealth (%)
IRA
Wealth/Total
Wealth (%)
Net Housing
Wealth/Total
Wealth (%)
Wealth Held
Directly in
Stocks /Total
Wealth (%)
Total of
Wealth Held
in Stocks
($000)
Total of
Wealth in
Stocks/Total
Wealth (%)

Average Asset Value for Respondents in Indicated Total Wealth Deciles
1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70

71-80

81-90

91-100

51.7 135.3 232.1 355.3 471.6 614.6 787.5 1,020.3 1,421.4 2,573.9
93.6 84.0 75.4 68.9 65.9 58.1 56.9
54.0
48.9
31.9

89.9

78.3

65.1

53.1

47.1

35.6

31.1

26.4

19.0

11.1

3.7

5.8

10.3

15.8

18.9

22.5

25.8

27.7

29.9

20.8

1.4

2.8

3.8

5.8

6.0

6.6

6.7

8.4

9.3

9.4

2.3

3.0

6.5

10.0

12.8

15.8

19.1

19.3

20.6

11.4

1.0

1.1

1.8

3.7

3.6

5.4

6.2

7.4

6.9

9.0

5.8

9.5

17.2

18.2

20.7

23.8

23.2

22.8

23.4

22.4

0.2

0.2

0.5

1.4

0.6

2.4

2.3

2.7

5.4

9.6

0.8

3.1

9.6

26.3

33.6

67.0

84.3

130.6

227.8

580.9

1.5

2.3

4.1

7.4

7.1

10.9

10.7

12.8

16.0

22.6
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Notes: Households with top and bottom 1% of total wealth are excluded. Values as of 2006 are
reported in thousands of dollars. Wealth in stocks includes share of defined contribution accounts
in stocks, share of IRA accounts in stocks, and direct stock holdings.
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Table 4: Distributional Effects on Retirement of the Decline in Stock Prices Due to the Dot Com
Bust
Years of Delayed Retirement
0

Age in 2000

1

2

3

4

5

Percentage of Simulations (%)

≤ 61

77.8

15.1

5.3

1.4

0.3

0.1

62-65

86.7

11

1.7

0.3

0.2

0

≥ 66

98.6

1.3

0.1

0

0

0

Overall

90.4

7.3

1.8

0.4

0.1

0
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Figure 1
Effects of 1995-1999 Stock Market Boom on Retirement
3.5

Percentage Point Change
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1
0.5
0
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1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Year
Increase in First Retirement
Reduction in Returns to Work

Full Bar: Increase in Net Retirement

Note: In 1996, 23% of the sample was 57 years old or younger, 28% was between 58 and 61
years old, 26% was between 62 and 65 years old, and 23% was 66 years old or older. The
vertical axis measures the change in percent retired in the specified years. The baseline
percentage retired rises from 47% in 1996 to 63.2% in 1999 and 82.5% in 2003.
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Figure 2
Effects of 2000-2002 Stock Market Bust on Retirement
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